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Abstract 
We study policies that are aimed at retaining a migrant workforce in a Gulf State while 
introducing a tax on migrant earnings. We single out Qatar as a case study. We consider 
two types of migrants: target migrants, and non-target migrants. If migrants are target 
migrants, we show that in order to neutralize the effect of a tax on their earnings, Qatar 
needs to extend the length of time migrants are allowed to stay. Such a scheme can work 
even when the migrants experience utility loss from staying longer in Qatar. If migrants 
are non-target migrants, we show that implementation of a lottery scheme in which the 
prizes are life-long residency in Qatar can “compensate” for the imposition of the tax. In 
both cases, we present numerical examples that illustrate the magnitudes involved.  
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1. Motivation 
Last year, the idea of taxing migrants’ earnings in the Gulf region in general, and in Qatar 
in particular, was raised with one of the authors of this note. The specific question posed 
was: can taxation of migrants’ earnings be implemented in a way that preserves their 
incentive to work in Qatar? Presumably, what prompted this question was the 
considerable pressure on the six Gulf States (GCC countries) to cut public spending in the 
wake of the sharp decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014. The aim of this note is 
to outline a response to this question. 
 In 2012-2015, oil revenues in the GCC countries accounted for about 50-90 
percent of total government revenues. From 2014 to 2015, government revenues from oil 
dropped from 33.9 percent of GDP to 21.8 percent of GDP (IMF, 2016). Lower oil prices 
are also likely to reduce the GDP and slow the pace of economic growth in the GCC 
countries (Nusair, 2016). For these reasons, the GCC countries started to search for 
policies that could increase government revenue while retaining the countries’ economic 
model and its supportive labor force architecture. In this area, several reforms were 
proposed, such as the introduction of a five percent Value Added Tax in all GCC 
countries, an increase in corporation tax from 12 percent to 15 percent in Oman, and an 
increase in gasoline prices in Qatar. Here we study another possibility, namely taxation of 
migrants’ earnings. 
We distinguish between two categories of migrants. First, we list considerations 
based on the assumption that migrants are target migrants, namely that the purpose of 
migration is to accumulate a specified quantity of funds (the target), and then return 
home. Second, we consider a policy response when the target does not apply, as when, 
for example, the migrants do not have any need or desire to go back home. We examine 
how the identification of migrants as target migrants or as non-target migrants can inform 
public policy, here - the taxing of migrant earnings.  
We focus on Qatar as a reference case study, assuming (if there were no tension 
between GCC countries) that taxation of migrants’ incomes, if enacted, will be 
synchronized across the GCC countries, thus excluding the possibility of selecting a low-
tax country within the GCC region, when such a selection is possible.  
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2. The case of target migrants 
Suppose that migrants seek to accumulate x income units, and then return to their home 
country. The migrants want to accumulate savings that will enable them to buy a truck, a 
tractor, start a business, build a house, make it possible for a child to go to college, marry 
well at home, and so on. We refer to such migrants as target migrants. Suppose that in 
order to amass x income units, migrants need to work n years, and that their permit for 
work in the host country is specified for n years. Assuming a zero rate of interest, savings 
per year is /x n  income units. Suppose now that the host country imposes income tax at 
the rate of τ , 0 1τ< < . The amount saved in n years will therefore be only (1 )x τ−  
income units. If when introducing the tax the host country extends the migrants’ 
permitted stay to / (1 )n τ−  years, then the migrants will end up accumulating their target 
x income units. (An underlying requirement for this scheme to work is that the migrants 
do not experience severe utility loss from staying longer in the host country; see below). 
Thus, a concrete policy of taxing migrants while retaining the migrant workforce in the 
host country will, simultaneously with the imposition of the tax, correspondingly extend 
the length of the migrants’ work permit. When this duration is synchronized with the tax 
rate (neatly configured as an increasing function of it), migrants will still want to stay. 
 
2.1 A modeling framework 
The preceding considerations can be summarized in the following utility function. (Later 
on in this sub-section we comment on the robustness of the results presented in this 
section to an alternative utility specification.) 
Let the utility function of an individual as a would-be migrant be:  
 
 ( )( )
1
0
max 1 ,0
n
k
k
U y xρ
−
=
# $
= + −% &
' (
∑ ,  (1) 
 
where x are the target savings that the individual seeks to accumulate in the course of his 
migration, y is the individual’s annual income as a migrant, and [0,1)ρ∈  is a discount 
factor. If the individual’s utility as a migrant is 0, then the individual does not migrate. To 
illustrate our argument, we use a linear specification, while aware that the particular 
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functional form to apply is an empirical issue, which we do not explore here. Denoting 
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= + =∑  ( * [ ,2 1)nnρ ∈ − ), an individual will consider migrating 
only if *y xρ ≥ , namely only if his discounted accumulated income is as high as or 
higher than his target savings. An implicit assumption is that work at home cannot yield 
x.1 For given y and x, we can calculate the minimal length of stay at destination that will 
render it worthwhile for an individual to migrate. To this end, we need to solve the 
equation 
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which can be rewritten as 
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Taking the logarithm of the two sides of (2) yields 
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Therefore, if an individual is allowed to stay for a duration that is equal to or is longer 
than *n , then migration will be attractive.  
 Suppose now that migrants’ earnings are subjected to income tax τ . Then, the 
utility function (1) will need to be reformulated to become 
 
                                               
1 For example, income at home is sufficient for basic needs, but is not high enough to permit accumulating 
savings for a given target in a reasonable time span.  
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and the minimal length of stay that will render it worthwhile for an individual to migrate 
will be  
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From inspection of (3) and (4) it follows that ** *n n> . 
We can next calculate by how much the minimal permitted length of stay will 
have to increase following the levying of an income tax, so that the individual will still 
find it worthwhile to migrate. The required extension is given by the difference  
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If an extended stay involves a utility loss, then we would need to incorporate in 
the utility function a cost term for the length of stay. To this end, we rewrite the utility 
function (1) as 
 
                                   ( )( ) ( )
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where ( )g n , such that ( ) 0g n! > , is the cost to an individual of being separated from 
family and home, which increases with the length of stay at an increasing rate, 
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( ) ( )( )2( ) 1 log 1 0nyg n ρ ρ
αρ
## > + + > ,2 and where 0α >  is a coefficient in the 
individual’s utility function that represents (measures) the weight accorded to this cost. In 
this case, then, the individual will favor migration only if ( )*y x g nρ α≥ + . We assume, 
that ( )*( )yh n y g nρ α= −  is a concave, inverse U-shaped function. The reasoning for 
making this assumption is that although, initially, an increase in the permitted length of 
stay renders migration more attractive, at some point, the utility loss from a longer stay 
takes over so that further increases in the permitted length of stay make migration no 
longer desirable. Then, two solutions to the equation  
 
 ( )yh n x=  (5) 
 
can exist, expressed as *1ˆn , and 
*
2nˆ  (where 
* *
1 2ˆ ˆn n< ) such that 
*
1ˆn  is the minimum length of 
stay allowed at destination that will render it worthwhile for an individual to migrate, and 
*
2nˆ  is the maximum length of stay that the individual will consider. We are interested in 
analyzing *1ˆn . In the proximity of 
*
1ˆn , ( )yh n  is a monotonic, increasing function of the 
length of stay, n , so it can be locally inverted, which yields 
 
 * 11ˆ ( )yn h x
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When an income tax, τ , is imposed, the minimal length of stay is given by 
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2 The condition ( ) ( )( )2( ) 1 log 1 0nyg n ρ ρ
αρ
## > + + >  is necessary for ( )*( )yh n y g nρ α= −  to be a 
concave function.  
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Because (at least in the neighborhood of *1ˆn ) ( )yh n  is an increasing function of both y  
and n , it is easy to see that ** *1 1ˆ ˆn n> . The exact difference 
** *
1 1ˆ ˆn n−  depends on the specific 
functional form of ( )g n . 
 
2.2 A numerical illustration 
We present a numerical illustration of our model, drawing on the Qatari migrant scene. In 
Qatar, migrants are permitted to stay for one to three years. Permission can be extended 
for further three years. Usually, migrants receive 600 riyals a month, plus 200 riyals for 
food and related expenditures. In order to obtain a job in Qatar, migrants typically spend 
about 4,000 riyals. We therefore assume that the annual income of a migrant is 
600 12 7,200y = ⋅ =  riyals. We do not include the sums allotted for food and related 
expenditures because they do not contribute to the target savings. In addition, we assume 
a discount rate of 1%.3 Data concerning target savings are not available to us. 
Nevertheless, we know that they are constrained by the income that as a target migrant, 
an individual accumulates over his stay because otherwise he would not migrate in the 
first place. Upper bounds of target savings are listed in column (ii) of Table 1. In our 
calculations, we do not include the 4,000 riyals that migrant workers have to spend in 
order to obtain a job in Qatar because this amount reduces both the target savings and the 
accumulated income and therefore does not change anything in the utility function (1). 
For the numbers displayed in column (ii), treated as estimates of x , we calculate the 
minimum length of stay after tax is levied by using (4). The calculations for three 
alternative tax rates are displayed in columns (iii) - (v) of Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3Consult http://www.cbq.qa/en/advice-and-information/information-library/rates-indices-and-
charges/pages/deposit-rates.aspx  
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Minimum desired length of 
stay when the tax rate is:  
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Current 
permission to 
stay is for: 
Target savings 
are lower than: 5%  10%  20%  
      1 year 7,200.00 1.05 1.11 1.25 
      2 years 14,472.00 2.10 2.22 2.49 
      3 years 21,816.72 3.16 3.33 3.74 
      4 years 29,234.89 4.21 4.43 4.98 
      5 years 36,727.24 5.26 5.54 6.21 
      6 years 44,294.51 6.31 6.65 7.45 
 
Table 1: A numerical illustration of the effect of a tax on migrant earnings on the 
migrants’ minimum desired length of stay. 
 
For example, for a target migrant who is currently permitted to stay in Qatar for three 
years, we obtain that on introducing a 10% income tax, the possibility of a stay of 3.33 
years should also be introduced (Table 1, column (iv)). 
 
 
3. And what if the migrants are non-target migrants?  
3.1 A tax compatibility condition 
When migrants are non-target migrants, a “tax compatibility” scheme could be 
implemented such that in conjunction with the introduction of an income tax on migrants’ 
earnings, migrants are allowed to participate in a lottery where the prizes are life-long 
residency in Qatar. The underlying idea here is that like others, migrants seek to improve 
the quality of their lives. Because the quality of life in Qatar is so much higher than in 
India, Nepal, Philippines, and Bangladesh (the main countries of origin of migrants), it is 
not unrealistic to assume that a prospect of life-long residency in Qatar will be prized 
highly. The distinction here between target and non-target migrants is that the latter do 
not place a high value on living in their home country but, rather, are content to move to 
other countries (alone or together with close family) when doing so increase   
substantially the quality of their life. With many people around the world who are happy 
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to move permanently to richer countries, there is no reason to assume that the same does 
not apply to at least some of the individuals who consider migrating to Qatar.  
In such a setting, we seek to compare the utility exhibited by the function  
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with the utility exhibited by the function 
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Where p is the probability of winning the lottery, V is the value that a migrant assigns to 
life-long residency in Qatar, and y , τ , and ρ  are as defined in Section 2. We can now 
formulate a condition under which migrants will be indifferent between a regime of no 
income tax and a regime in which a tax is imposed in conjunction with a lottery. 
Comparing (7) with (8), this condition is  
 
 ( )( ) * *1 1p y pV yτ ρ ρ− − + = , 
 
which, simplified, can be expressed as 
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In order for p  to be smaller than 1, it has to hold that *V yρ> , which is quite likely, 
especially as life-long residency in Qatar includes the possibility of working there for n  
years. Indeed, and quite intuitively, (9) implies that the higher the tax rate, τ , the higher 
the probability of winning the lottery, p , needs to be.  
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3.2 A numerical illustration 
As with Section 2, here too we provide a numerical example. In Table 2, columns (iii) - 
(xi) present probabilities of winning the lottery which render migrants indifferent 
between the utility exhibited in (7) and the utility exhibited in (8). We consider three 
different tax rates, three different values of V , and six different levels of earnings, 
depending on the current length of migrants’ permitted stay (analogously to Table 1, 
column (i)). Thus, for example, for a migrant who is currently allowed to stay in Qatar 
for three years, and who values life-long residency in Qatar at 200,000 riyals, we see that 
in conjunction with the introduction of a 10% income tax, a lottery with a probability of 
winning of 1.21% should be introduced (column (iv) in Table 2) in order to keep the 
utility levels of the migrants constant. Whether or not having, say, 12,100 migrants out of 
1,000,000 migrants becoming permanent residents is valued by Qatar more than taxing 
the earnings of all 1,000,000 migrants by 10 percent is a decision that is not for us to 
take. But the numbers involved are clearly defined.  
 
  Value assigned to life-long residency in Qatar: 
 !! 200,000.00 400,000.00 600,000.00 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) 
Current 
permission to 
stay is for: 
Earnings 
Tax rate  Tax rate  Tax rate  
5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20% 
1 year 7,200.00 0.19% 0.37% 0.74% 0.09% 0.18% 0.37% 0.06% 0.12% 0.24% 
2 years 14,472.00 0.39% 0.77% 1.54% 0.19% 0.37% 0.75% 0.12% 0.25% 0.49% 
3 years 21,816.72 0.61% 1.21% 2.39% 0.29% 0.57% 1.14% 0.19% 0.38% 0.75% 
4 years 29,234.89 0.85% 1.68% 3.31% 0.39% 0.78% 1.55% 0.26% 0.51% 1.01% 
5 years 36,727.24 1.11% 2.20% 4.31% 0.50% 1.00% 1.98% 0.32% 0.65% 1.29% 
6 years 44,294.51 1.40% 2.77% 5.38% 0.62% 1.23% 2.43% 0.40% 0.79% 1.57% 
 
Table 2: A numerical illustration of the effect of a tax of migrants’ earnings on the 
probability of winning the lottery for non-target migrants. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
We have shown how it is possible to retain a migrant workforce while imposing a tax on 
migrants’ incomes. The specific policy to be implemented will depend on the nature of 
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the migrants: in the case of target migrants, the option of a well-defined extension of stay 
will incentivize them to stay in Qatar even when their income is taxed there. In the case 
of non-target migrants, a lottery where the prizes are life-long residency in Qatar will 
have the same effect.  
 The numerical examples presented in Sections 2 and 3 provide illustrations of the 
magnitudes involved. For concrete, realistic estimates, however, a survey study could be 
undertaken in order to collect information about target savings, the utility loss associated 
with an extended stay by target migrants, and the value that non-target migrants assign to 
life-long residency in Qatar.  
 The question as to what type of migrants (for example, low-skill or high-skill) 
Qatar should take is beyond the scope of this note. The purpose of the note is to illustrate 
how once the optimal number of migrants (possibly of different skill levels) is decided, a 
taxation scheme can be implemented that, consequently, will not reduce the migrant 
workforce.  
Furthermore, the terms of reference of this note are not to engage in a 
comparative analysis of alternative taxation policies aimed at contributing to the coffers 
of the country’s treasury. If a decision is to be made to tax migrants’ incomes, we have 
shown how simple analytical considerations could be brought to bear on the choice of the 
respective amounts. We hasten to add that because it is unlikely that the revenue obtained 
from the proposed tax will be sufficient to cover the bulk of the budget shortfall or the 
budget needs of the government, the proposed scheme will have to be implemented in 
conjunction with other tax policies.  
An inference to be drawn from this note is that depending on context and 
circumstance, to prevent a remedial action from inflicting harm, taxes need to be 
configured in such a way that, in conjunction with their imposition, incentive-preserving 
steps will also be implemented. 
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